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Exploring a Security Protocol for Secure Service Migration
in Commercial Cloud Environments
ABSTRACT
Mobile users are making more demands of networks. They
want to run applications such as network steaming of audio
and video as well as immersive gaming that demand high
Qualities-of-Service. One way to address this problem is
by using mobile services that move around as users move
around. This ensures that low latencies are maintained be-
tween the client and the server resulting in a better Quality-
of-Experience. In addition, the advent of virtual machine
technology for example, VMware, and container technol-
ogy, such as Docker, have made the migration of services
between different Cloud Systems possible. Furthermore, a
Service Oriented Architecture that supports service migra-
tion in Cloud environments has been proposed. Though
there are many things in place to support mobile services,
a key component that is missing is the development of se-
curity protocols that allow the safe transfer of servers to
different Cloud environments. In particular, it is important
that servers do not end up being hosted on unsafe Cloud
infrastructure and also Clouds do not end up hosting mali-
cious servers. This paper proposes a new security protocol
to address this issue. The protocol is specified and tested
using AVISPA. The initial results indicate that the protocol
is safe and therefore can be used in practical systems.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is an emerging technology and along
with mobile services, is rapidly becoming the next Internet-
based enterprise platform. Currently, data owners are mi-
grating their data to cloud storage platforms without buy-
ing any storage devices. This gives many benefits to the
large enterprises as well as to individual users because it re-
duces the cost of storage services and allows these services
to be managed in a more dynamic way. Cloud computing
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is, therefore, facilitating the migration of data and services.
These services are called mobile services and will be used to
support mobile users as they move around. These services
can migrate between clouds to reduce the latency between
the service and the mobile users, hence maintaining a good
Quality of Service (QoS) to users. For example, two people
are watching a video in London; if they then take a train
from London to Cambridge, the video service will notice
that the increasing latency between the users and the server
and may choose to replicate the service on Cloud systems
nearer to Cambridge. In addition, in this brave new world,
Cloud Providers will actively advertise their Cloud resources
to mobile services which will use these advertisements to dy-
namically migrate its servers to these Clouds.
In this new environment, mobile users will demand to be
always connected using heterogeneous networking. Mobile
devices will, therefore, have several wireless interfaces in-
cluding Wi-Fi, LTE, 5G, satellite and Ultra-wideband inter-
faces. These networks will seamlessly work together using
vertical handover techniques [14]. The Y-Comm architec-
ture [15] has been developed to build future mobile systems
that can provide seamless communications. Hence, future
mobile systems will need to support both mobile users and
mobile services. Though extensive work has been done to
support mobile users, less work has been done on the devel-
opment of mobile services. However, there is now increasing
interest in this area as there is a need to provide services
at the edge of the network, i.e. to support edge-computing.
One aspect of the research on mobile services that has been
inadequate is support for security [5]. In particular, it is im-
portant that servers do not end up being hosted on unsafe
Cloud infrastructure which can hamper service delivery to
mobile clients and also Clouds do not end up hosting mali-
cious servers which can damage Cloud infrastructure. This
paper attempts to address these issue by providing a new
security protocol for secure service migration. This security
protocol is specified for service migration over the Cloud and
is tested through a simulation study using the Automated
Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications
(AVISPA) tool which is used for the analysis of large-scale
Internet security sensitive protocols and applications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the related work; Section III describes background
methodologies for our solution approach. Section IV details
our solution approach while Section V shows the results for
the test scenario. The paper concludes with Section VI.
2. RELATEDWORK
2.1 Migration of services
Service migration has been proposed for many environ-
ments and is increasingly being used in Cloud environments
that support virtualisation. This is possible because the vir-
tual machine paradigm allows entire virtual machines to be
migrated. Virtual machine migration can be expensive as
the entire virtual machine has to be moved. The emergence
of container technology, such as Docker [1], in which con-
tainers housing several services can be migrated is gaining
in prominence[reference]. Unikernels [11] in which the op-
erating system is bounded and customized to run a single
main application is the next emerging specimen in this genre
and should, from a management point-of-view, make server
migration simpler. However, these efforts assume that the
communication architecture does not help facilitate server
migration which makes these mechanisms difficult to use in
Wide Area Networks (WANs).
2.2 The Y-Comm Framework
Y-Comm is an architecture that has been designed to
build heterogeneous mobile networks. It attempts to inte-
grate communications, mobility, QoS and security into a sin-
gle platform. It divides the Future Internet into two frame-
works: the Core Framework and the Peripheral Framework.
The researchers of Y-Comm have made major contributions
in the areas of proactive handover [13] as well as introducing
new concepts in security such as Targeted Security Mod-
els [12]. Other network architectures for mobile systems
such as Hokey [9], Ambient Networks [18] and Mobile Eth-
ernet [16] have also been explored. HoKey looked at issues
of secure handover in heterogeneous networks while Ambi-
ent Networks concentrated on supporting seamless connec-
tivity in diverse networks. Mobile Ethernet adopted the
Core/Peripheral structure like Y-Comm but assumed an Ethernet-
type Core. A comparison of these systems indicate that Y-
Comm offers the most functionality and flexibility [3] while
integrating various key mechanisms [2], [4].
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Figure 1: The Y-Comm Framework: The Reference
Model
The Y-Comm Reference Model is shown in Figure 1. A
more detailed description of the Y-Comm Framework is given
in [15]. However, it should be noted that Y-Comm supports
a layer for mobile services called the Service Platform Layer
in the Core Network. This layer allows services to be in-
stalled and managed coherently in future networks including
support for the mobile services.
2.3 A Service-Oriented Framework for Mo-
bile Services
In order to provide a complete set of mechanisms to en-
able mobile services, it is necessary to develop a new Service
oriented Architecture that allows services to be managed,
copied or migrated to support mobile users [6]. The system
should also provide algorithms that incorporate traffic man-
agement as well as the QoS requirements of the flow. This
new Framework was proposed in [10] and has six layers as
shown in Figure 2, which, from the top to the bottom, are
briefly described below:
• The Service Management Layer: This layer man-
ages the service that is being provided. It specifies the
functions of the service, registers the service in a ser-
vice registry and obtains a unique Service ID. It also
specifies the minimum resources required by network-
ing and cloud infrastructure needed to run the service
in terms of computing resources, network Quality-of-
Service requirements and storage needs.
• The Service Subscription Layer: This layer han-
dles the functions required for global clients to use the
service. It therefore allows clients to subscribe to ser-
vices. It provides the user with a unique Client ID,
a given Service Level Agreement (SLA) and sets up
accounting and payment mechanisms.
• The Service Delivery Layer: The layer is in charge
of delivering the service to a given client. It first maps
the SLA to a given QoS and ensures that the selected
server as well as its networks can meet the required
QoS. The service also receives notifications and trig-
gers about handovers and based on these notifications,
may replicate or migrate the service closer to the user.
• The Service Migration Layer: The layer handles
the replication or migration of services to different
cloud platforms to facilitate a good QoE for the mobile
user. Migration is done at the request of the Service
Delivery Layer.
• The Service Connection Layer: This layer is re-
sponsible for managing the connection between a client
and the service and reports changes in transport or
network parameters such as bandwidth or delay to the
Service Delivery Layer.
• The Network Abstraction Layer: This layer al-
lows the service to interface to different types of net-
works, depending on network architecture and address-
ing. In the current Internet, this layer maps onto IP
networking with TCP/IP. In more advanced systems
such as Y-Comm, this functionality is spread between
the QoS and Transport Layers in Core and Peripheral
Frameworks.
This is a powerful framework that can be used to allow
services to migrate from one Cloud to another Cloud. The
work of Sardis [19] showed that in order to migrate a service
it is necessary to compare the time taken to migrate the
service with the amount of time the user will be in the region
concerned. Hence, the mobility model of the user must be
considered. Sardis used a simple queuing model to represent
user mobility in mobile networks.
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Figure 2: Service-Oriented Framework for Mobile
Services
2.4 The emergence of Edge Computing
The desire to localise services has led to the emergence of
edge computing where compute servers are placed on Cloud
close to the edge rather than the centre of the Internet [20],
[8]. This reduces latency and provides high bandwidth via
the local network. Edge computing also enables support for
networks that provide highly mobile environments such as
Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs). In addition, mobile
edge computing is also being used to support communication
using 5G Cloud Enabled Small Cells [7].
Though all these mechanisms are promising developments,
it is necessary to consider security as part of the overall
design. This paper addresses this issue in the context of the
Service-Oriented Framework described above.
3. SPECIFY THE SECURITY PROTOCOL
FOR MOBILE SERVICES
In this section, we look at protocols for secure service mi-
gration. As stated previously, the main issues are fraudu-
lent Cloud providers that entice the service providers to host
their services on faulty Cloud facilities resolving in data loss
and lack of service as well as misbehaving services which
convince cloud providers that they are well-behaved systems
leading to mismanagement and abuse of Cloud facilities. We
focus on developing a security protocol that handles these
issues.
A key component of these mechanisms is the use of a
Registry. A Registry or Certificate Authority (CA) is a
trusted party that issues signed electronic documents to ver-
ify whether the party is a valid entity on the Internet. Elec-
tronic documents used as digital certificates are important
in public key encryption(PKE), usually, these certificates in-
clude the owner’s name, public key, the expiration date of
the digital certificate, location of the owner and other data
of the owner. CA lists will be maintained on operating sys-
tems and browsers. The Registry contains secure informa-
tion about services including Cloud facilities. In addition,
the registry can talk securely to both services and Clouds
using public key encryption. All service and cloud providers
must register their services with the Registry. The Registry,
therefore, has public keys of all Cloud Systems and Servers
in the systems. In this section, we specify two situations:
the first is when the server migrates from home network to
a cloud. The second is service migrate between two clouds.
Below we look at these situations in turn.
3.1 General Notation
3.1.1 The Server
The server (S) as represented by:
Server ID, Type of service (TOS), Public Key (PKS).
The server is identified by a unique Service Id which is given
to the server when it registers with the Registry. The server
is located at a place denoted by X, when the server is located
in its home network X= H; X = A when the server has
migrated to Cloud A and B for Cloud B.
3.2 Cloud Facilties
The Cloud facilities are represented as follows:
Cloud A (CA) = Cloud ID A, TOS = Cloud, PKA, Re-
sources.
Cloud B (CB) = Cloud ID B, TOS = Cloud, PKB, Re-
sources.
Each Cloud is uniquely identified by a Cloud ID and since
they are cloud services, TOS = Cloud; PKA and PKB are
public keys for Cloud A and Cloud B respectively. In ad-
dition, each Cloud will have a number of resources which it
actively advertises to servers.
3.2.1 The Registry
The Registry is the last key component and is used to
verify the identities of all servers on the network. In addi-
tion, the Registry knows the Service IDs and Public Keys
for each service.
We represent the public key for the registry as PKR.
Registry(R) = PKR
3.3 Nonces denoted by N
Nonces are randomly generated numbers which are un-
forgeable and are used as session tokens, ensuring that re-
quests cannot be repaid by unauthorised personnel.
3.4 Timestamps denoted by T
Timestamps are used explicitly with migration requests
and responses. This allows the system to evaluate how long
it takes for requests to be granted and how long it takes
for migration transfers to complete. In the protocol, times-
tamps are represented as simple strings.
4. MIGRATIONFROMCLOUDATOCLOUD
B
In this section, we look at when the service moved from
Cloud A to Cloud B. The protocol is followed in exactly the
same way as outlined above:
The full explanation of this second migration is given be-
low:
• Step 1 The service on Cloud A receives advertisements
from Cloud B advertising Cloud’s B resources.
• Step 2 The Server checks the validity of Cloud B.
• Step 3 Registry authenticates Cloud B
• Step 4 The server on Cloud A sends a request to mi-
grate to Cloud B
Algorithm 1 Security Protocol for Migration between
Cloud A to Cloud B
1: CB → SA: Advertisement (CloudID B, TOS, Re-
sources, PKB)
2: SA → R: Verify Identity (CloudID B, TOS, PKB, Re-
source, Server ID, PKS) PKR
3: R→ SA: Message: YES (CloudID B, TOS, PKB, Valid
Resources) PKS
4: SA → CB: Migration Request + (Server ID, TOS, TA,
Req.Resource, PKS, NA) PKB
5: CB → R: Verify Identity (Server ID, PKS, TOS, Cloud
ID B, PKB) PKR
6: R→ CB: Message: Yes (Server ID, TOS, Valid Service)
PKB
7: CB → SA: Migration Response + (Cloud ID B, TOS=
Cloud), TB, Resources Granted, NA, NB) PKS
8: SA → CB: Transfer (Migration) + (Server ID,
CloudID B, Services, NB) PKB
9: CB→ SA: Transfer Ack (Server ID, CloudID B, NA,
Tcomp) PKS
10: SB→ R: Transfer-Complete + (Server ID, CloudID B,
TOS, TA, TB, Tcomp) PKR
• Step 5 Cloud B sends a request to make sure that the
server, S, is a valid service:
• Step 6 The Registry validates Cloud B
• Step 7 Cloud B signals to The Service on Cloud A
that it is OK to migrate the service to Cloud B:
• Step 8 The Service signals to Cloud B to migrate the
service:
• Step 9 Cloud B signals to the server on Cloud A that
the migration is complete: Hence, New Location:
(SA→SB) The service is now started on Cloud B.
• Step 10 The service on Cloud B signals to the Registry
that the migration has been completed:
Figure 3 shows the steps for Cloud to Cloud migration of
services.
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Figure 3: Migration from Cloud A to Cloud B
4.1 Key Observations
There are important observations to be made with this
protocol. Firstly, nonces are used to protect this session
between the Server and the Cloud to which the server wants
to migrate.This is done using an extended approach based
on the Needham Schroeder protocol [17]. This is seen in the
following steps:
• In Step 4, the Server uses NA as part of the transfer
request .
• In Step 7, Cloud B replies to the Server using NA and
NB as part of the transfer response.
• In Step 8, Server authorises the transfer of the service
to Cloud B using NB.
• In Step 9, Cloud B signals that the transfer is com-
pleted using NA.
It is also essential to understand Step 10 in which the
new transferred service reports back to Registry about its
new location. This allows the Registry to be able to track
server migration in response to user needs and therefore can
be used to do more effective planning of server provision
which will cope with user mobility. From a security point
of view this is better than having to track individual users.
In addition, by submitting the timestamps, it is possible to
find out how much time it took for Cloud A to reply to the
Server’s migration request (TB - TA), as well as the time
taken to do the actual transfer (Tcomp - TB). These values
are used by the Registry to track the migration performance
of individual Clouds. The Registry therefore is being used
to give insight into the performance of the infrastructure.
4.2 Using AVISPAs
In this section, AVISPA is used to analyse the protocol
specified in the previous section. AVISPA provides auto-
mated validation of Internet security protocols and appli-
cations. We propose the use of formal validation methods
and model checking for security properties of these protocol.
Here, we represent that formal specification and verification
are carried out using the role based language , HLPSL(See
Appendix) and AVISPA model checker which automates
the model checking of the protocol and uses the parame-
ters necessary for the formal verification of secure service
for these protocols. In simple, we modelled in HLPSL and
analysed with Avispa tool. It supports for multiple back-
end tools such as On the ı¨nˇC´y Model-Checker (OFMC),
Constraint-Logic-based Attack Searcher (CL-AtSe), SAT-
based Model-Checker (SATMC), and Tree Automata based
on Automatic Approximations for the Analysis of Security
Protocols (TA4SP) and it verifies the security properties for
a bounded number of sessions. When we develop a secure
service migration protocol, it is important to prove that it
has the expected results by the security properties or pa-
rameters. In HLPSL, to model the system refers that model
the components of the security properties. Each backend
tool has its own options and components to define the for-
mal verification. After the execution process, the output
describes the results of the protocol. The output is listing
the common format of Summary, Details of bounded num-
ber of sessions and the goals. The AVISPA model checker,
a widely accepted tool, provides the results of whether the
security protocol is SAFE or UNSAFE.
4.3 HLPSL
We know that the AVISPA framework is role based and
it gives more important to roles rather than exchanging in-
formation. In order to verify the security properties of the
security protocol, we had to model three roles: Cloud A,
Cloud B and the Registry, describing the actions of protocol.
The roles can declare a set of local variables before the ini-
tialization of the model checking section, this initialization
section is followed by the state transition section. HLPSL
defines two composed roles: the session role and the envi-
ronment role. The HLPSL provides the security properties
in GOAL section.
4.4 OFMC and ATSE
After completing the specification as described above, we
divided the verification process into two steps. The first step
was to validate the specification using OFMC back-end tool
of AVISPA, and the second step was to use ATSE back-
end. In our protocol, AVISPA Outputs SAFE from OFMC
and ATSE. The first back end tool is called OFMC, On-
the-fly-model checker, verifies that combination of two main
concepts. In the summary section of the results shown in
Figures 4 and 5, based on the protocol specification, indi-
cates that the protocol is SAFE. The second back end tool is
called ATSE, Constraint-Logic-based Attack Searcher (CL-
AtSe), also indicates that the protocol is SAFE. Now, both
of the protocol results SAFE, so that the probability of the
expected result is accomplished.
Figure 4: OFMC: Cloud A to Cloud B
Figure 5: ATSE: Cloud A to Cloud B
5. FUTUREWORK
Using AVISPA tool, we are able to show that the protocol
specified is safe in normal operation. More work is being
done to analyse intruder attacks to show that the proposed
protocol is secure against the active and passive attacks in-
cluding replay and man-in-the-middle attacks.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented a new security protocol for server
migration between commercial Cloud environments. The
system uses a Registry which validates servers and Cloud
infrastructure as well as monitors the migration pattern of
services to give an indication of user demand. In addition,
the system records the responses of the Cloud Infrastructure
to server requests. The protocol was verified using AVISPA.
More work is being done to make this protocol resistant to
intruder attacks.The protocol is safe under normal opera-
tion; the present protocol critically prevents impersonation
attacks either by rogue cloud infrastructure hoping to sneer
valid services or by malicious servers wanting inflict damage
on Cloud infrastructure. We are exploring how this protocol
and be enhanced to prevent intruder and man-in-the-middle
attacks.
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APPENDIX
This is HLPSL file for the new security protocol.
role clouda A( A,B,R : agent, PKA : public key, SND R,SND CB,RCV R,RCV CB:
channel (dy)) played by A def= local State:nat,
NA,NB,TA,TB,TOS,Tcomp,Verify : text,
Services,Succ,Ack,Resources,Advertisement : message,
PKS,PKB,PKR : public key,
Sec Services,CloudID A,CloudID B,Server ID,
Migrequest,Migresponse : protocol id
init
State := 1
transition
2. State = 1 /\RCV CB(Advertisement.CloudID B.TOS’.Resources’.PKB’)
=|> State’:= 3 /\Server ID’:=new() /\PKS’:=new() /\SND R(Verify.CloudID B.TOS’.PKB’.Resources’.
Server ID’.PKS’ PKR)
4. State = 3 /\RCV R(Succ.CloudID B.TOS’.PKB’.Resources’ PKS)=|> State’:=
5 /\TA’:=new(),NA’:=new() /\SND CB(Migrequest.Server ID’.TOS’.TA’.Resources’.PKS’.NA’ PKB)
8. State =5 /\RCV CB(Migresponse.CloudID B.TOS’.TB’.Resources’.NA’.NB’ PKS)=|>
State’:=7 /\SND CB(Server ID’.CloudID B.Services.NB’ PKB) /\secret(PKS,Sec Services,A,B)
10. State = 7 /\RCV CB(Ack.Server ID’.CloudID B.NA’.Tcomp’ PKS) =|> State’
:= 9
end role
role cloudb B( A,B,R : agent,
PKB : public key,
SND SA,SND R,RCV SA,RCV R : channel (dy))
played by B
def=
local
State:nat,
NA,NB,TA,TB,TOS,Tcomp,Verify : text,
Services,Succ,Ack,Resources,Advertisement : message,
PKS,PKA,PKR : public key,
Migrequest, Migresponse,Sec Services,CloudID A,CloudID B,Server ID : pro-
tocol id,
init
State := 0
transition
1. State = 0 /\RCV SA(start) =|> State’:= 2 /\TOS’:=new(),Resources’:=new(),PKB’:=new()
/\SND SA(Advertisement.CloudID B.TOS’.Resources’.PKB’)
5. State = 2 /\RCV SA(Migrequest.Server ID’.TOS’.TA’.Resources’.PKS’.NA’ PKB)
=|> State’:=4 /\SND R(Verify.Server ID’.PKS’.TOS’.CloudID B.PKB’ PKR)
7. State = 4 /\RCV R(Succ.Server ID’.TOS’.Services PKB)=|> State’:=6 /\NB’:=new(),TB’:=new()
/\SND SA(Migresponse.CloudID B.TOS’.TB’.Resources’.NA’.NB PKS)
9. State =6 /\RCV SA(Server ID’.CloudID B.Services.NB’ PKB)=|> State’:=8
/\Tcomp’ :=new() /\SND SA(Ack.Server ID’.CloudID B.NA’.Tcomp’ PKS) /\SND R(Server ID’.CloudID B.TOS’.TA’.TB’.Tcomp’ PKR)
end role
role registry R( A,B,R : agent,
PKS,PKA,PKB : public key,
SND CA,RCV CA,RCV CB,SND CB,SND SA,
RCV SA,RCV SB : channel(dy))
played by R
def=
local
State:nat,
Tcomp,TOS,NA,NB,NH,TA,TB : text,
Services,Succ,Resources : message,
PKR : public key,
Services,Verify: text,
Sec Services,CloudID A,CloudID B,Server ID : protocol id
init
State := 10
transition
3. State = 10 /\RCV SA(Verify.CloudID B.TOS’.PKB’.Resources’.Server ID’.PKS’ PKR)
=|> State’:= 12 /\SND SA(Succ.CloudID B.TOS’.PKB’.Resources’ PKS)
6. State =12 /\RCV CB(Verify.Server ID’.PKS’.TOS’.CloudID B.PKB’ PKR) =|>
State’:= 14 /\SND CB(Succ’.Server ID’.TOS’.Services PKB)
11. State = 14 /\RCV SB(Tcomp.Server ID’.CloudID B.TOS’.TA’.TB’Tcomp’ PKR)=|>
State’:=16
end role
role session( A,B,R : agent,
PKS,PKA,PKB,PKR : public key)
def=
local SND CA, RCV CA,SND CB, RCV CB,SND R, RCV R,
SND SA,RCV SA,RCV SB:channel(dy)
composition
clouda A(A,B,R,PKA,SND R,RCV R,SND CB,RCV CB) /\cloudb B(B,A,R,PKB,SND CA,SND R,RCV CA,RCV R)
/\registry R(A,B,R,PKS,PKA,PKB,SND CA,RCV CA, RCV CB,SND CB,SND SA,RCV SA,RCV SB)
end role
role environment()
def=
const
a,b,r : agent,
pka,pks,pkb,pkr : public key
composition
session(a,b,r,pks,pka,pkr,pkb) /\session(b,a,r,pks,pka,pkr,pkb) end role
goal secrecy of sec services end goal
environment()
